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PRODUCTS LIABILITY: EXPANDING THE PROPERTY
DAMAGE EXCEPTION IN PURE ECONOMIC LOSS
CASES
The term economic loss permeates the law of damages.' It is a
broad term which includes lost wages in personal injury cases and lost
profits in breach of contract cases. 2  Economic loss has also been iden-
tified with a narrow class of products liability cases. In these cases
there has been no personal injury and no damage to property other
than the defective product, but only a pecuniary loss resulting from the
purchase of a defective product. These so-called "pure economic loss"
cases encompass those situations where a product defect causes damage
to the product itself, thereby rendering the product useless.3 For ex-
ample, a consumer purchases a large air conditioner to cool his factory.
Soon after installation the unit fails to operate correctly. Attempts at
repairing the air conditioner fail forcing the consumer to purchase a
new unit.4 In this situation the pecuniary loss sustained by the con-
sumer has been characterized as economic loss or "damages for inade-
quate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product,
1. Damages may be defined as "pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be re-
covered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether to his
person, property or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 466 (4th ed. 1968). "Damages," as defined above, is to be distin-
guished from "property damage," which will be discussed throughout this note.
2. Economic loss is a term .which has been loosely applied by the courts in various situa-
tions.
It has been used as a measure for damages in wrongful death cases. For instance, in Lengel v.
New Haven Gas Light Co., 142 Conn. 70, 111 A.2d 547 (1955), the court held, "As we have
frequently said in the past, damages for death are awarded to meet the economic loss sustained by
the decedent's estate, although some allowance may be made for the death itself." Id at 77, 111
A.2d at 551 (emphasis added). See also S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH, ECO-
NOMIC HANDBOOK (1970).
Economic loss has also been employed in a recent case to describe generally the purchaser's
or user's loss in strict liablility cases. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d
1, 14, 374 N.E.2d 437, 443 (1978).
In some instances economic loss describes what constitutes consideration in a contract.
Where there has been economic loss there is usually detriment that has value in the market and
can be measured with money. A. CORIN, CONTRACTS § 122 (1963)
3. Note, The Vexing Problem of the Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability. An Injury in
Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. RE. 145, 154-55 (1973). The author further explains that
pure economic loss cases can be subdivided into direct economic loss and indirect economic loss
cases. "A direct loss includes a diminution in the value of the product as measured by the differ-
ence between the purchase price or value of the product as represented to the purchaser and the
value of the product after discovery of the defect." Id Indirect loss includes losses of future
business profits and business opportunities.
4. Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 I11. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 25-27 infra.
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or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of damage to other
property."' 5 When a consumer incurs economic loss as a result of a
defective product, a majority of courts hold that the loss is not recover-
able under the tort theories of negligence 6 or strict liability
7 in tort.8
Rather, the courts will deem the express9 and implied warranty' 0 theo-
ries of the law of sales to be an adequate vehicle for recovery. The
rationale behind this theory is that the law of sales, rather than the law
of torts, was intended to protect the economic interests of consumers.l'
It is feared that if tort-based theories of recovery are employed in pure
economic loss cases, the resulting increase in litigation will impose an
onerous burden on manufacturers.
12
There is, however, one exception to the general rule prohibiting
recovery of economic loss under negligence or strict liability theories.
5. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918
(1966). In Pioneer Hi Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Talley, 493 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), the court
similarly defined economic loss. The court stated, "When the loss does not involve harm or
damage by the product to the property or person of the user, the loss is deemed as economic only."
Id at 607.
6. Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972); Gherna v.
Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966); Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157
Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958); Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423,
302 P.2d 665 (1956), disapproved on other grounds, Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 30-31, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 689, 694, 377 P.2d 889, 894 (1963); Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 312
A.2d 322 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973), aftd and remanded on other grounds, 336 A.2d 211 (Del. 1975);
Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Constr. Co., 280 A.2d 730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Chrysler Corp. v.
Taylor, 141 Ga. App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 111.
App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977); TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., I Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d
284 (1955), affdmem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956); Inglis v. American Motors
Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965).
7. Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Cloud v. Kit
Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alas. 1977); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alas.
1976); Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973); Seely v. White Motor, 63 Cal.
2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965); Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442,
102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972); Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141 Ga. App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977);
Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 I11. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977); Rhodes
Pharmacal Co. v. Continental Can Co., 72 I11. App. 2d 362, 219 N.E.2d 726 (1966); Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Thermal Supply of Texas, Inc. v. Asel, 468
S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
8. Products liability is an area of tort law pertaining to the liability of sellers of defective
products to third party purchasers with whom they are not in privity of contract. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as PROSSER]. The sellers' liability encom-
passes physical harm caused by the defective product such as personal injuries and damage to
property other than the defective product. Recovery is generally grounded in negligence and
strict liability. PROSSER § 101. However, where there has been no personal injury and no dam-
age to property other than the defective product but only a pecuniary loss resulting from the
purchase of a defective product, the courts have traditionally refused to permit recovery under
negligence or strict liability theories. This note will consider this latter area of cases.
9. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1972 version).
10. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (1972 version).
11. Seely v. White Motor, 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21, 403 P.2d 145, 149 (1965).
12. TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., I Misc. 2d 477, 482, 148 N.Y.S. 2d 284, 290 (1955), a 9d
mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956).
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This exception may be referred to as the property damage exception.
The term "property damage" is a subcategory under the generic term
"pure economic loss," in that the consumer in property damage cases
sustains economic loss from the purchase of the defective product as
does the consumer in other pure economic loss cases. The distinguish-
ing feature of the two theories is that the product defect in property
damage cases causes the product to sustain physical harm in a violent
or sudden manner,13 while in the typical pure economic loss case, the
product defect causes the product to sustain physical harm in a gradual
manner or simply renders the product useless. For example, a con-
sumer purchases a trailer home. As a result of certain defects within
the home, a fire starts and the entire home is destroyed.' 4 The con-
sumer has incurred economic loss by way of "property damage."
Under these circumstances the courts will allow the consumer to re-
cover the replacement value of the home under the tort theories of neg-
ligence or strict liability. If, however, the trailer home deteriorates
over a period of time due to poor workmanship or negligent design, the
only remedy available to the purchaser will be through express or im-
plied warranty theories.' 5 The rationale for the property damage ex-
ception is that "in situations where personal injuries could have
occurred, courts should not hesitate to grant relief to the party suffering
[the economic loss] damage simply because he was fortunate enough to
have escaped personal injury."'
6
The purpose of this note is to critically examine the property dam-
age exception in pure economic loss cases. In order to analyze the
problems associated with the exception, as it exists in a majority of ju-
risdictions today, the rationale of those courts which follow the" view
that tort recovery should not be allowed in pure economic loss cases
unless property damage is proven will be set forth. The reasoning of
these jurisdictions will be contrasted with that of jurisdictions which
have broadened the concept of property damage to include situations
where the defective product has sustained physical harm in a gradual
manner, notwithstanding normal deterioration. Finally, it will be sub-
13. See Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 683 (1967).
14. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alas. 1977); see text accompanying notes 38-39
infra.
15. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alas. 1976); see text accompanying
notes 36-37 infra.
16. Note, The Vexing Problem ofthe Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability.- An Injury in
Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 145, 154 (1973). See also Seely v. White Motor, 63
Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965). In that case the court held, "Physical injury to
property is so akin to personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing them." Id at 19,
45 Cal. Rptr. at 24, 403 P.2d at 152.
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mitted that the property damage exception should be expanded to in-
clude all cases where the product has incurred any type of harm as a
result of a defect in the product itself.
PURE ECONOMIC Loss: THE GENERAL RULE
The leading case espousing the view that tort recovery should not
be allowed in pure economic loss cases was the California Supreme
Court decision of Seely v. White Motor. '7 In Seely, plaintiff entered
into a conditional sales contract for the purchase of a truck manufac-
tured by defendant for use in his business of heavy-duty hauling. The
truck developed a defect known as galloping which caused it to bounce
violently. Attempts at repairing the truck failed. Later, while the
plaintiff was driving the truck, it suddenly went out of control and
overturned. The uninjured plaintiff had the physical damage sus-
tained by the truck repaired. When the plaintiff notified the dealer
that he would not continue to make payments on the truck, it was re-
possessed. The plaintiff brought an action seeking damages related to
the accident for the truck, damages unrelated to the accident for the
galloping problem and lost profits in his business because he was un-
able to make normal use of the truck.
In an opinion delivered by Justice Traynor, the California
Supreme Court held that the damages unrelated to the accident consti-
tuted economic loss and, therefore, were not recoverable in strict liabil-
ity.' 8 Traynor stated: "The law of sales has been carefully articulated
to govern the economic relations between suppliers and consumers of
goods."' 19 Traynor emphasized that manufacturers should not be held
liable under tort theory in pure economic loss cases:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for
physical injuries and warranty recovery ... rests ... on an under-
standing of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must un-
dertake in distributing his products .... He cannot be held for the
level of performance of his products in the consumer's business un-
less he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer's
demands.
20
A number of other jurisdictions have adopted this rationale and
have denied recovery for repair and replacement costs in pure eco-
nomic loss cases where the cause of action had been predicated on neg-
17. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
18. Id at 17, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151.
19. Id at 15, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 21, 403 P.2d at 149.
20. Id at 18, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151.
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ligence or strict liability. 21 Two recent decisions in Georgia and
Illinois have followed the rationale promulgated by Justice Traynor in
Seely.
In Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor,22 plaintiff bought a new car that had
been manufactured by defendant. The car had numerous operating
defects which were never repaired adequately. Plaintiff filed an action
grounded in negligence and strict liability seeking damages for loss of
the benefit of the bargain, the replacement of the defective Dodge,
wages lost while attending to the vehicle and attorney's fees. The
Georgia appellate court held that the economic loss sustained by the
consumer was not recoverable under tort theories stating, "If a con-
sumer wishes to recover for a loss of bargain through its purchasing of
defective goods in the absence of fraud, it should pursue recovery
under warranty laws."' 23 The court further pointed out why the doc-
trine of strict liability in tort did not apply to the case. The court said,
"We hold that an 'injury'... does not include damages stemming from
loss of the benefit of one's bargain. The history of the doctrine of strict
liability in tort indicates that it was designed... to govern the distinct
problem of physical injuries."
24
The Illinois appellate court was confronted with similar issues in
Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp.25 The plaintiff in Koplin
purchased an air conditioner which failed within two years of the in-
stallation date. A second unit was purchased and installed in August,
1971; it failed in June, 1973. Plaintiff brought an action in negligence
to recover for damages resulting from the breakdown and failure of the
two units. The damages sustained included repair and replacement
costs. Resolving an issue of first impression, the Illinois appellate
court denied recovery in both negligence and strict liability for the eco-
nomic loss resulting from the product defect.26 In adopting the Seely
rule the court held that recovery for damages resulting from the air
conditioners should have been limited to a warranty theory under the
law of sales.
27
21. See notes 6-7 supra.
22. 141 Ga. App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977).
23. Id. at 672, 234 S.E.2d at 124.
24. Id (citation omitted).
25. 49 IUl. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977).
26. Id at 204, 364 N.E.2d at 107. It was unnecessary for the court to rule on the strict
liability issue since plaintiff's action was predicated solely on negligence.
27. Id at 204, 364 N.E.2d at 107.
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PURE ECONOMIC Loss: THE PROPERTY DAMAGE EXCEPTION
The majority of courts which follow the Seely decision permit re-
covery of economic loss in negligence or strict liability where a product
defect causes a product to incur physical harm in a sudden or violent
manner. 28 In these limited fact patterns the consumer is not forced to
rely solely upon warranty theories of the law of sales29 as a basis for
recovery. To qualify for the property damage exception, "the accident
must be a casualty involving some violence .. .not a mere marked
deterioration, or even a complete ruin brought about by internal de-
fect."'30 This exception to the general rule of no recovery is recognized
because the fact patterns involved in these cases usually give rise to
personal injuries for which damages are recoverable under tort theo-
ries. The courts reason that the fact that the party suffering the eco-
nomic loss was fortunate enough to have escaped personal injury
should have no bearing on whether tort theories may be employed as a
basis of recovery.
31
The majority of courts have been strict in their application of the
property damage exception's sudden harm requirement. Illustrative of
this is the New York case of TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. 32 In TWA,
plaintiff sued for repair and replacement costs sustained as a result of
defects which had developed in certain airplane engines. Parts of the
engines had been worn away while in flight as a result of latent defects.
28. Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alas. 1977); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548
P.2d 279 (Alas. 1976); Seely v. White Motor, 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965);
Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1972); Gherna v. Ford
Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966); Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal.
App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (1958); Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302
P.2d 665 (1956), disapproved on other grounds, Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 30-31, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 689, 694, 377 P.2d 889, 894 (1963); Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc., 312
A.2d 322 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973), aff'd and remanded on other grounds, 336 A.2d 211 (Del. 1975);
Crowell v. Topkis Constr. Co., 280 A.2d 730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141
Ga. App. 671, 234 S.E.2d 123 (1977); Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 I11. App. 3d
194, 364 N.E.2d 100 (1977); TWA v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284
(1955), aftdmem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956); cf. Fredonia Broadcasting Corp.
v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973); Beauchamp v. Wilson, 21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41
(1973); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Thermal Supply of Texas,
Inc. v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (these cases adopted the general rule prohibit-
ing tort recovery in pure economic loss cases but expressed no opinion on whether the property
damage exception was also adopted). But see Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb.
546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
29. See notes 9-10 supra.
30. Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 863, 323 P.2d 227, 229 (1958); see also
PROSSER, supra note 8, § 101 ("[W]here there is no accident, and no physical damage... purely
economic interests are not entitled to protection against mere negligence, and so [courts] have
denied the recovery."). Id.
31. See note 16 supra.
32. 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), aff'dmem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d
546 (1956).
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The engines had developed the foreseeable potential to cause cata-
strophic disaster. Yet, the court denied recovery under a negligence
theory because the physical harm had not been sustained in a cata-
strophic or violent manner. The court stated, "It is only when the dan-
ger inherent in a defectively made article causes an accident that a
cause of action against the manufacturer also arises.
' 33
The reasoning of the New York court in TWA was adopted by the
Delaware Superior C6urt in Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Construction Co.
34
In that case the plaintiff-owner sued a subcontractor in negligence for
damages sustained as a result of defects which created a dangerous
condition in newly constructed walls. Costs were incurred in the re-
pairing of the walls. The court, in denying recovery of the economic
loss, held, "The great weight of authority does not yet permit tort re-
covery under the circumstances here present in the absence of ... [a]
dramatic incident such as accident, collapse or explosion. '35
The Alaska Supreme Court also has strictly applied the property
damage exception in cases predicated upon strict liability in tort. In
Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,36 plaintiff purchased a mobile
home manufactured by defendant. Within six months defects devel-
oped causing the roof to leak, the wall paneling to buckle, the door
frames on the bedroom door to fall off, and the closet doors to slide
improperly. Plaintiff sought recovery of repair and replacement costs
under a strict liability theory. The Alaska Supreme Court refused to
extend the property damage exception to include a situation where the
physical harm to the product was incurred in a gradual manner. 37 The
court ignored the fact that the pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff
was substantial.
One year later the same court permitted recovery in strict liability
in a case where the sudden harm requirement of the property damage
exception had been satisfied. In Cloud v. Kit Manufacturing Co.,38
plaintiff purchased a mobile home in October, 1973, that was manufac-
tured by defendant. In early January, 1974, plaintiff stored a roll of
polyurethane foam padding in a crawl space beneath the mobile home.
The roll was not placed in close proximity to the electric heating unit,
yet, on January 23, 1974, the rug pad ignited, causing the mobile home
to catch fire, destroying the home. Plaintiff sought recovery in strict
33. Id at 482, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
34. 280 A.2d 730 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
35. Id at 732.
36. 548 P.2d 279 (Alas. 1976).
37. Id at 286.
38. 563 P.2d 248 (Alas. 1977).
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liability for damages based on the replacement cost of the home. Re-
covery was permitted because the consumer had sustained property
damage. The court stated:
We recognize that the line between economic loss and direct property
damage is not always easy to discern, particularly when the plaintiff
is seeking compensation for loss of the product itself. We cannot lay
down an all inclusive rule to distinguish between the two categories;
however, we note that sudden and calamitous damage will almost
always result in direct property damage and that deterioration, inter-
nal breakage and depreciation will be considered economic loss.
39
The language of the Cloud court is somewhat misleading. Indeed,
the fire causing the destruction of the trailer home constituted physical
harm and that physical harm was incurred in a sudden and calamitous
manner. However, the ultimate loss to the plaintiff was economic loss,
i e., the replacement cost of the home. Similarly, in Morrow, the
plaintiff sustained economic loss, measured by the replacement cost of
the home. Yet, the Alaska Supreme Court in Cloud stated that eco-
nomic loss was not involved. Cloud may be better understood as a
case involving economic loss where the property damage exception was
applied in order to allow recovery in strict liability. The property
damage exception was applicable since the sudden harm requirement
was met. The strict application of the property damage exception by
the Alaska Supreme Court is consistent with the view of the majority of
jurisdictions.
EXPANDING THE PROPERTY DAMAGE EXCEPTION:
GRADUAL PHYSICAL HARM
A number of jurisdictions have impliedly expanded the concept of
property damage to include situations where the product defect causes
the product to incur physical harm in a gradual manner.4° In these
cases the physical harm sustained by the product was not related to the
normal and expected deterioration incurred by the product. These ju-
risdictions have permitted recovery of damages for economic loss
under tort theories of negligence and strict liability in cases where the
sudden harm requirement has not been satisfied.
Negligence
For example, in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply,
39. Id at 251.
40. See cases cited in notes 42, 43, 46 and 48 infra.
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Inc. ,'41 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover repair costs where cinder blocks used in the construction of a
building pitted and deteriorated over a period of months. The court,
in dicta, suggested that in the future such complaints should be framed
in tort.42 The court then concluded that recovery should have been
permitted on a theory of either negligence or implied warranty.
The Superior Court of Delaware, in Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc.
v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. ,43 was faced with a factual situation similar to that
in Spence. In Cannon, plaintiff sought to recover, in negligence, the
payment made for the relining of certain chemical tanks. The tanks
had been painted in December, 1969, and by May, 1970, the linings
had peeled and the tanks had begun to rust. The court held that plain-
tiff's claim was recoverable because the physical harm sustained by the
chemical tanks was of a sudden and immediate nature.44 It is clear,
however, that the deterioration actually occurred over a six-month pe-
riod.45 Hence, the Cannon court held sub silentio that it was unneces-
sary for the physical harm to have been sustained in a sudden or
violent manner in order to invoke the property damage exception in
pure economic loss cases. This represents a clear expansion of the
property damage exception in negligence cases.
Strict Liability
The Colorado and Wisconsin Supreme Courts have allowed re-
covery in strict liability when the product defect causes the product
itself to incur physical harm in a gradual manner. In Hfigel v. General
Motors Corp. ,46 the Colorado Supreme Court was confronted with an
action for damages caused by the defective rear chassis of a motor
home. Plaintiff was forced to make numerous repairs to the home and
suffered business losses because he was unable to use the vehicle at all
times. Plaintiff sought recovery of damages based on the replacement
cost of the rear chassis, repair expenses, and loss of business. Despite
the fact that there was no violent accident and plaintiff suffered no per-
sonal injuries, the court allowed recovery under the theory of strict lia-
41. 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W,2d 873 (1958).
42. Id at 131, 90 N.W.2d at 878-79; accord, Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr., Co., 79
N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968); Temple Sinai-Suburban Reform Temple v. Richmond, 112 R.I.
234, 308 A.2d 508 (1973); Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705 (1961).
43. 312 A.2d 322 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973).
44. Id at 329. The court stated, "It can be reasonably argued that there has been an acci-
dent in the basic sense that there was in fact immediate physical injury to the storage tanks not
caused by normal wear and tear." (emphasis supplied).
45. Id at 324.
46. 544 P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975).
CHICAGO-KENT LW REVIEW
bility in tort.47
Recovery of damages was also allowed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in a case factually similar to Hfige. In City ofLaCrosse v. Schu-
bert, Schroeder & Associates, Inc. ,48 plaintiff, a municipality, entered
into an agreement with a contractor to install a roof on an elementary
school. The first roof, installed in 1968, began to leak soon after instal-
lation. A replacement roof, installed in September, 1968, also leaked.
Finally, in November, 1970, a portion of the roof blew off, necessitating
the complete replacement of the roof in 1971. Plaintiff sued in strict
liability to recover the costs of repair and replacement of the defective
roof. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to recover damages
under a strict liability theory.49 The fact that the property damage was
not incurred in a sudden or violent manner did not prevent the court
from allowing recovery. Moreover, the court recognized that the re-
pair and replacement costs sustained in this pure economic loss case
were clearly recoverable, stating, "We are also of the opinion that a
strict-liability claim for pure economic loss involving only the cost of
repair or replacement of the product itself and loss of profits is likewise
not demurrable." 50 Thus, Hfige! and LaCrosse clearly illustrate a mi-
nority position which adopts the view that the property damage excep-
tion should be expanded in strict liability cases to include situations
where the product sustains physical harm in a gradual manner.
PRODUCT MALFUNCTIONS
A minority of courts have recognized that recovery of economic
loss should be allowed in negligence and strict liability in all cases
where the product defect causes the product to become useless.51 In
these cases it is irrelevant how the product incurred the harm; it is only
significant that the product is defective.
Negligence
Several courts have adopted the view that the manufacturer owes a
duty to the user or consumer to exercise due care to avoid foreseeable
harm to the users of his product. 52 Under this view, a manufacturer
47. Id at 989.
48. 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
49. Id at 44, 240 N.W.2d at 127.
50. Id
51. See notes 52 and 58 infra.
52. Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965); Quackenbush v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y.S. 131 (1915); State ex rel Western Seed Prod. Corp. v.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
can be liable in negligence for any losses sustained as a result of a prod-
uct defect.
In State ex rel. Western Seed Production Corp. v. Campbell,53 the
plaintiffs, several sugar beet growers, sought recovery in negligence
against a seed supplier for crop loss damage resulting from a defect in
the seeds purchased from the supplier. The Oregon Supreme Court
upheld the negligence action, stating, "Where the other elements of a
negligence case are present, we see no reason why the availability of a
tort remedy should depend upon whether the harm was traumatic.
' 54
The Washington Supreme Court recently applied the negligence
theory to a situation where the product failed to operate correctly. In
Berg v. General Motors Corp. , the plaintiff purchased a diesel engine
for his fishing boat. The engine malfunctioned, causing the plaintiff to
incur business losses. The court, in allowing the action, reasoned that
allowing recovery in negligence would not subject manufacturers to in-
discriminate liability.56 The court was unable to find a substantive ba-
sis for denying lost profits against the remote manufacturer under a
negligence theory.57  The court emphasized that the limitation on re-
covery in negligence cases is the foreseeability of harm, not the manner
in which the harm occurred.
Strict Liability
A minority of jurisdictions recognize that the manufacturer of a
defective product should be liable in pure economic loss cases under
strict liability theory.58 To these courts, it is irrelevant that the product
incurred harm in a violent or gradual manner. It is sufficient that the
Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1968); Berg v. General Motors
Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
In recognizing that the manufacturer or remote supplier owes a duty to the public to exercise
ordinary care in the manufacture of products, one commentator has adopted the position that
recovery of damages should not be denied in negligence if the sudden harm requirement of the
property damage exception has not been satisfied. In support of this proposition, he notes that
"such harm is within the range of reasonable manufacturer foresight, which should raise at least a
duty of care unless some compelling economic or social or administrative reason dictates other-
wise." Franklin, When Worlds Collide.- Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product
Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 984 (1966).
53. 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968).
54. Id. at 269-70, 442 P.2d at 218.
55. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
56. Id at 593-94, 555 P.2d at 823.
57. Id
58. Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970); Herbst-
man v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,
44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d
193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
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product did not perform adequately and as a result the consumer in-
curred repair and replacement costs.
The leading case applying the strict liability theory in actions of
this kind was the New Jersey Supreme Court decision of Santor v. A &
M Karagheusian, Inc. 59 In Santor, plaintiff purchased carpeting from
a retailer of the defendant-manufacturer. The carpeting was sold as
Grade One. In January, 1958, the carpeting was laid, and almost im-
mediately plaintiff noticed an unusual line in it. The dealer advised
plaintiff that the line would wear away with time. In the span of two
months two additional lines appeared in the carpeting. Plaintiff sued
under a breach of warranty theory for the purchase price. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, adopting a strong consumer protection ap-
proach, held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages under
strict liability theory. 60 The court stated:
The obligation of the manufacturer thus becomes what in justice it
ought to be - an enterprise liability, and one which should not de-
pend upon the intricacies of the law of sales. The purpose of such
liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or damage, either to the
goods sold or to other property, resulting from defective products, is
borne by the makers of the products who put them in the channels of
trade, rather than by the injured or damaged persons who ordinarily
are powerless to protect themselves.6'
Santor marked a radical departure from those jurisdictions which
strictly interpreted the property damage exception in strict liability
cases.
Santor was adopted by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Cova v.
Harley Davidson Motor Co. 62 The plaintiffs, doing business as Bob-O-
Link Golf Course, purchased golf carts manufactured by the defend-
ant. The golf carts malfunctioned and plaintiffs sued for damages
based on repair costs and lost profits. Recovery of damages based on a
strict liability theory was permitted by the court.63 This position ad-
59. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
60. Id at 67, 207 A.2d at 312.
61. Id at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
62. 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
63. Id at 603, 182 N.W.2d at 810. However, the precedential value of Sanlor and Cova is
severely limited because the strict liability theory of Michigan and New Jersey differs significantly
from the theory of strict liability embodied in section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1965). See note 66 infra, for a discussion of the various theories of strict liability. The
New Jersey and Michigan courts have adopted the theory of implied warranty in tort. Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Piercefield v. Remington Arms
Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965). Consequently these courts have not considered the
issue of whether section 402A was intended to encompass economic loss resulting from the simple
malfunctioning of a product.
One court has confronted this factual situation. In Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks
Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973), plaintiff purchased ten large electric motors
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vanced by the minority recognizes that the concept of strict liability is
broad enough to include all harm incurred by a consumer due to a
defective product. If the property damage exception is broadened to
encompass all types of harm incurred by a product, the general rule
which prohibits tort-based recovery in pure economic loss cases will be
effectively disregarded by the courts.
ANALYSIS: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
It is submitted that the property damage exception is far too nar-
row. Its effect has been to limit recovery in tort to a narrow class of
cases where a product has sustained physical harm in a violent or sud-
den manner. The consumer has been left unprotected in many other
cases. This is because the consumer's bases for recovery under the
warranty theories of sales law have often proved to be inadequate. 64 By
adhering to the sudden harm requirement of the property damage ex-
ception, the majority of courts have failed to recognize that the amount
of damages in pure economic loss cases is not directly related to the
manner in which the harm was incurred. A consumer may sustain
enormous pecuniary loss when the defective product has not incurred
harm in a violent or sudden manner. Yet, under the majority rule the
consumer may not sue in tort to recover damages unless there is proof
of property damage.
The concept of property damage should be expanded to include all
cases where the product has incurred any type of harm as a result of a
defect in the product itself. By broadening the property damage ex-
ception, the general rule will become inoperative and consumers in
pure economic loss cases will be able to sue under the theories of negli-
gence or strict liability as well as under warranty theories. This will, of
course, not result in automatic recovery as the consumer will still be
for factory use. Six of these motors failed causing plaintiff substantial damages. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court stated significantly that section 402A was broad enough to include "any damage
inflicted upon the person or property.... [It] cover[s] practically all of the harm that could befall
one due to a defective product." 58 Wis. 2d at 218, 206 N.W. 2d at, 427 (citation omitted).
64. The consumer is not always protected by the warranties of the U.C.C. See notes 9-10
supra. Three defenses may be employed by the manufacturer in order to preclude recovery of
damages under a warranty theory: 1) Plaintiff did not give timely notice of the breach of war-
ranty to the defendant, see 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 102 (1972). 2) Defendant had
expressly and effectively disclaimed liability for damages such as those for which plaintiff was
seeking to recover, see 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability §§ 120, 121 (1972); but see Magnuson-
Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(1976). 3) Plaintiff was not in privity of contract with defendant, see 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products
Liability §§ 163 164 (1972). See generally L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§
16.02-16.05 (1968).
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required to prove a prima facie case in negligence 65 or strict liability.66
In an effort to balance the interests of both the consumer and man-
ufacturer, the courts may properly focus upon the bargaining position
of the parties in order to limit recovery in tort in pure economic loss
cases. It is urged that the courts consider the bargaining positions of
the parties as a criterion for determining whether a plaintiff in a pure
economic loss case will be given the opportunity to sue under negli-
gence or strict liability theories. This criterion has been referred to as
the "consumer" test.67 The theory behind this test is that the law of
sales has developed to regulate "commercial transactions," i.e., situa-
tions where the parties are in equal bargaining positions. Hence, if the
transaction is commercial, sales law should be sufficient; if, however,
there is evidence of bargaining inequality, tort principles should be em-
ployed to protect the consumer.
6
Several courts have implied that recovery of damages in pure eco-
nomic loss cases would have been allowed in tort if there had been
evidence of inequality in the bargaining positions of the parties.69 In
65. The elements of actionable negligence include: "a breach of duty on the part of the
seller toward the person complaining of the defect, and an injury to the person to whom that duty
is owed proximately resulting from the breach of duty on the seller's part." 63 AM. JUR. 2d
Products Liabiliy § 25 (1972). Problems of proof in a products liability suit predicated on negli-
gence are discussed in 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 125 (1972).
66. The prima facie case in strict liability differs according to which theory of strict liability is
adopted by the particular jurisdiction. At least three different theories of strict liability may be
identified: implied warranty in tort, Restatement-based theory, and the California view. i)
Under the implied warranty in tort theory, which is to be distinguished from implied warranty
under the law of sales, the consumer is under a burden to prove a specific defect in the product
which damages the consumer. The product must be proven to be of unmerchantable quality.
Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 611, 182 N.W.2d 800, 806 (1970). 2) A
number of jurisdictions follow the language of section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS (1965). Section 402A requires the plaintiff to prove: a) that he was injured by the prod-
uct; b) that the product was in an "unreasonably dangerous condition at the time it left the control
of the manufacturer;" c) that there was a chain of proximate causal connection between such
condition and plaintiff's injuries. This requirement of proof would prohibit plaintiffs in numer-
ous pure economic loss cases from being allowed a means of recovery under strict liability. A
consumer who purchases air conditioners which simply fail to operate correctly would be unable
to rely on strict liability to obtain recovery. The air conditioners may indeed be in a defective
condition, but this defective condition is typically not unreasonably dangerous. 3) A third view of
strict products liability focuses neither on merchantability nor on the unreasonably dangerous
requirement, but instead looks to whether there was a defect which caused injury to a user or
consumer. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134-35, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 443, 501 P.2d
1153, 1163 (1972). The California Supreme Court in Cronin rejected the unreasonably dangerous
requirement of the Restatement. However, by stating that the plaintiff must only prove that the
product was defective, it is not altogether certain that "unreasonably dangerous" will be aban-
doned as a criterion. "In the final analysis the test of defectiveness of a product is whether it is
unreasonably dangerous." 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.40 (1977).
67. See Franklin, supra note 52, at 988.
68. Id at 989.
69. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp.
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Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Allis- Chalmers Manufacturing Co. ,70
a power company sued the manufacturer of faulty transformers in strict
liability to recover damages based on repair expenses. In denying re-
covery of damages in this case, the Iowa federal district court held, "It
may be that in a situation where there is inequality of bargaining posi-
tion between the consumer and the manufacturer, the Iowa Court
would allow such recovery."
'71
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Santor also relied upon the
unequal bargaining power between the parties in justifying the recov-
ery of economic loss under a strict liability theory. The court stated
that the purpose behind imposing liability upon the manufacturer is
that the injured persons are ordinarily "powerless to protect them-
selves."' 72 The court implied that the ordinary consumer should there-
fore be protected under tort theory.
The law of products liability has historically responded to the
needs of consumers. 73 Consequently, it would certainly be justifiable
to allow the consuming public to rely on tort theory in order to recover
damages in pure economic loss cases where the parties were in unequal
bargaining positions.
CONCLUSION
An expansion of the property damages exception in pure economic
loss cases would undoubtedly aid the consuming public. The con-
sumer would no longer be shackled to the warranty theories of the law
of sales in attempting to recover damages where he has purchased a
defective product. Rather, he could turn to the tort-based theories of
negligence and strict liability. The availability of warranty theories
should not preclude recovery under tort theory.
74
There is ample precedent for expanding the property damage ex-
ception to include cases where the product defect causes the product to
incur physical harm in a gradual manner. These jurisdictions recog-
nize that the law of torts is concerned with the degree of loss to the
506, 515 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F.
Supp. 25, 32 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305,
312 (1965). Contra, Seely v. White Motor, 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23, 403 P.2d 145, 151
(1965).
70. 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
71. Id at 32.
72. 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965).
73. See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.
L. REV. 791 (1966).
74. Theories of tort and contract, with relation to products liability are not inconsistent with
or repugnant to one another. 72 C.J.S. Products Liability § 9 (Supp. 1975).
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consumer, not the manner in which the harm was incurred. This same
judicial attitude has been expressed by those jurisdictions adopting the
position that the law of torts should protect the consumer in all cases
where the product defect causes the consumer to sustain economic
lOSS. 7 5
Realizing that the expansion of the property damage exception
represents a radical approach to a majority of jurisdictions, it is sug-
gested that the courts adopt the consumer test in order to determine
whether tort theory may be employed in prre economic loss cases.
The courts are free to adopt the above suggestions in an effort to pro-
vide a rational framework in which to decide the cases within this area
of products liability jurisprudence.
ARNOLD GENE RUBIN
75. "[DJue care should be encouraged by the law. Carelessness can only lead to waste of
both lives and dollars." Franklin, supra note 52, at 985.
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